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I. INTRODUCTION
There will be differences of opinion as to whether these [unemployment]
problems are always brought about directly by tariff concessions ...
Even if they are not always directly attributable to . . . imports, they are
sometimes thought to be; and what people think to be the truth has a very
controlling influence on their decisions. This is a political fact that many
of us have to live with.
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
May 4, 19551
Free trade has long raised the specter of job loss to a wide range of
American workers, particularly in periods of recession. Today, with
the weakening of free-trade supporters, 2 and the corresponding protec-
tionist pressure mounting,' Congress may be taking its eye off the long-
term benefits of free trade4 and focusing instead on the short-term, po-
litically attractive benefits of protectionism.' This Comment argues,
however, that protectionism will in fact add many new faces to
America's unemployment lines, and prolong the world recession-for
protectionism invites retaliation, and no nation is so insulated from the
world economy that it can pursue protectionism without suffering itself
from resulting protectionism.6
More importantly, this Comment argues that from an economic
point of view, liberal trade policies provide more benefits than costs.7
Combined with an effective marketing strategy for United States ex-
ports, free trade creates jobs.' Therefore, Americans should see liberal
trade policies not as a threat to American jobs, even though some job
displacement will inevitably result.9 Rather, Americans should recog-
nize the job-creating potential of such policies.
1 101 CONG. REc. 5572 (1955).
2 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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Americans would be better able to adopt this view if the federal
government designed a program that enabled import-affected workers
to adjust to foreign competition. This was the theory of Congress when
it created worker adjustment assistance."0 Simplified, the theory is that
through supplemental unemployment insurance, retraining, job search
grants and relocation allowances, import-affected workers would move
from domestic industries in a condition of permanent decline due to
comparative disadvantage, to existing or new industries in fields in
which the United States possesses a comparative advantage.11
Originally proposed in 1954,12 the first program of worker adjust-
ment assistance was part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.13 In
1974 the program was made part of the Trade Act of that year.14 To-
day, however, the future of worker adjustment assistance is uncertain.
Under the Trade Act, the current program expires September 30,
1983.15
Unfortunately, worker adjustment assistance has not enabled
many workers to adjust. The program has been an abysmal failure.
This Comment reveals two fundamental reasons for this failure. First,
the program is underinclusive. Although clearly victims of trade read-
justments, service and component-parts workers have been excluded
from the program. 16 Second, the program has not been administered
by the federal government, but by state agencies lacking national per-
spective. As a result, the program has not been administered uni-
formly, and the assistance that truly enables workers to adjust-
retraining, job search grants and relocation allowances-has gone un-
used. 7 Rather than enabling import-affected workers to gain new em-
ployment in more promising industries, the program has merely
10 In its broadest sense, adjustment assistance encompasses aid to workers, employers, and
communities that have been adversely affected by imports. This Comment, however, focuses ex-
clusively on the assistance provided to import-affected workers.
11 See infra notes 93, 108 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
13 Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
14 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
15 Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2512, 95 Stat. 358, 888 (1981). On June 23, 1983, the House Ways and
Means Committee cleared legislation that would extend the program beyond September 30, 1983.
Wall St. J., June 24, 1983, at 42, col. 4. The bill is H.R. 3391, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983), and
would "authorize $200 million to help train workers who lose their jobs because of increased
imports." Id Although its trade subcommittee has conducted hearings on the matter, the Senate
Finance Committee has not, as of June 24, 1983, scheduled any sessions to write a similar bill of
its own. Id
16 See infra notes 126, 139, 144 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 104-06, 110 and accompanying text.
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provided supplemental unemployment insurance."8
This Comment argues, however, that America cannot afford to
throw the concept of worker adjustment assistance out with the current
program's bath water. From an economic point of view, tariffs and
quotas inhibit the flow of international trade, while worker adjustment
assistance does not. Moreover, assistance targeted specifically to im-
port-affected workers costs far less nationally than tariffs and quotas.
Finally, a redesigned program must replace the current program be-
cause, from a political point of view, free trade policies cannot be pur-
sued without it.' 9
In response to this need, this Comment presents a six-point plan to
create a fairer, more effective worker adjustment assistance program
for the future.2" The cornerstone of this new program is its emphasis
on retraining and private sector involvement. The State Job Training
Coordinating Councils created under the Job Training Coordinating
Partnership Act2' would be authorized to facilitate the retraining of im-
port-affected workers through cooperative efforts by businesses, schools
and state government.22 The Training Councils would function as a
catalyst by providing grants on a competitive basis to nonprofit training
and education institutions that in turn obtain an equal financial match
from one or more businesses.23
In sum, the Training Councils would be endowed with funds to
target to import-affected workers, identify growth industries and
promising fields, and then provide grants to training institutions that
develop innovative retraining programs and that have obtained an
equal financial match from one or more businesses.24 Thus, import-
affected workers would be retrained for available positions in cooperat-
ing firms, and the theory of worker adjustment assistance would be
realized.
II. THE PROTECTIONIST MOOD
There is a growing protectionist sentiment among American voters
and in Congress. Increased foreign competition has inflicted severe
damage on vulnerable American industries. Nearly everyone can re-
call the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, and the dramatic gasoline price
18 Id
19 See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
21 Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982).
22 See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.





increases. With the high cost of gasoline and concern for its continued
availability, demand for automobiles shifted from large and mid-size
models to more efficient compact and sub-compact models. Almost
overnight, foreign carmakers captured a major share of that market. In
California, for example, foreign imports account for nearly half the
sub-compact market.25
The American auto industry has been in a profound slump for
nearly four years.26 General Motors has closed four assembly plants,
Ford has closed three, and Chrysler has closed two.27 As a result, more
than 346,000 auto-making jobs have disappeared since 1978.28
Most Americans blame foreign auto imports for the unemploy-
ment of American auto workers. Their blame is probably well placed,
although recession and high interest rates are also primary causes of
the auto workers' plight.2 9 Moreover, Americans are insecure about
the auto industry's ability to compete with foreign competitors in the
future. They believe the ominous projection of one General Motors
official, who said that "[i]f we were sure right now that [American] car
sales were never going to get better, you'd see another whole wave of
plant closings at least as large as what's happened already."30 Con-
gressmen are listening to the fears of their constituents. Last session,
more than half the members of the House of Representatives cospon-
sored a labor-backed "domestic content" bill that would require a set
percentage3 of United States-made components in foreign autos sold
in this country. 2 Presidential aspirant Walter Mondale has joined the
drive by Douglas Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers, for the
passage of this proposal. 3 If enacted, it could force foreign auto mak-
25 Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1982, at 2, coL 2.
26 Id
27 Id
28 11 Million Jobless, and Worst Is Yet to Come, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 18, 1982, at
72.
29 See id
30 Wall St. J., supra note 25. Depressed American car sales have forced the auto industry to
operate remaining assembly plants at an average of just over half of capacity. Id
31 The bill would impose a gradually increasing percentage. By 1986, for example, 90% of the
components in a car made by a company with annual sales of over 900,000 vehicles would have to
be domestically made. If annual sales were 700,000 vehicles, 70% of the components would have
to be domestically made. Car makers with annual sales below 100,000 vehicles would be unaf-
fected. Require U.S. Parts in Foreign Cars?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 7, 1983, at 47. For a
comprehensive outline of the proposal, see Fraser, Domestic Content of USAutomobile Imports: A
UAWProposal, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1981, at 57.
32 Bacon, Protectionism Rising in New Castle, Ind, andAcross the Nation, Wall St. J., Dec. 2
1982, at I, col. 6.
33 Stone, Time to Junk "Free Trade"?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 22, 1982, at 96.
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ers to build more cars in the United States.34
Foreign competition has stiffened in other domestic markets over
the past twenty years, most notably in the textile, apparel, and leather
goods markets.3 1 In 1960, the value of imports constituted less than
five percent of the gross national product.36 Today it exceeds thirteen
percent.37 Even in the specialty steel market, where domestic produc-
tion is generally regarded as efficient and technologically up to date, 8
imports have made tremendous inroads. During the first eight months
of 1982, imports captured enough of the United States specialty steel
market to trigger emergency action under international trade rules.39
America's competitive position has also slipped in world markets
over the past twenty years. In 1960, the United States share of world
exports of manufactures was twenty-five percent. 40  By 1980, it had
slipped to less than seventeen percent.4 1 Many Americans blame the
Common Market for the loss of overseas markets for American prod-
ucts. The Common Market heavily subsidizes credit to foreign custom-
ers, thereby winning sales from American firms. In addition, American
farmers argue that aggressive European farm export subsidies have
eroded their overseas markets.42 In the summer of 1982, the American
Farm Bureau Federation, long a leader in the free trade movement,
overcame "a strong distaste for export subsidies" and asked the Reagan
administration for help.43 Sensing the protectionist mood of the nation,
the Reagan administration responded in early 1983 by subsidizing the
sale of one million metric tonnes of wheat flour to Egypt.' Egypt has
been a major market for subsidized flour exports from the Common
34 Bacon, supra note 32. Toyota Motor Company's motivation to enter into a joint venture
with General Motors Corp. to make small cars in the United States appears to be based on a
desire to mollify anti-import sentiment in the United States. Koten and Kanabayashi, G.M '90%
Sure" of Joint- Venture Accord with Toyota in U.S. as the Talks Drag On, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983,
at 14, col. 2-3; Koten, How Toyota Stands to Gain From the GM Deal, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1983, at
14, col. 3-5.
35 See Schoepfle, Imports and Domestic Employment: Identifying Affected Industries,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Aug. 1982, at 13.
36 Choate and Epstein, Te Work Force of the Future, NATION's Bus., Nov. 1982, at 58.
37 Id
38 U.S. to Probe Aid to Steelmakers in Six Countries, Wall. St. J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
39 Imports captured between 1 I% and 50% of the United States specialty steel market during
this period. Id
40 Choate and Epstein, supra note 36.
41 Id
42 Birnbaum, Wheat Grows the Same in Kansas and France, But Not the Subsidies, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
43 Bacon, supra note 32, at 14, col. 4 (quote from Robert Delano, president, American Farm
Bureau Federation). The federation represents over three million farm families. Id




III. RECESSION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTIONISM
The nation endured a painful recession in 1982. The gross na-
tional product, adjusted for inflation, fell 1.8% from the 1981 average,
the steepest decline in thirty-six years.46 The unemployment rate rose
to 10.8% of the labor force,4 7 the highest jobless rate in forty-one
years.48 Over eleven million Americans were unemployed.49 With this
high number of jobless Americans, existing jobs naturally become
more valuable, and their holders more defensive. Notwithstanding the
benefits of free trade, shielding domestic industries from foreign com-
petition so as to keep people working has become an increasingly per-
suasive alternative.50 In short, a protectionist sentiment among voters
and in Congress exists naturally as a result of the nation's unacceptably
high number of people out of work.51  By contrast, in a full-employ-
ment economy, dislocations resulting from imports, while unpleasant,
are tolerable because import-affected workers can find alternative em-
ployment with less difficulty.
Moreover, the 1982 recession was worldwide. 52 Given America's
weak economy, this is somewhat natural. Worldwide economic health
is dependent to a large degree on a healthy and growing United States
icy, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1983, at 2, coL 4. This sale represents one-sixth of the world's annual
trade in wheat flour. Id at col. 3.
To subsidize the sale, the federal government will give United States millers enough federally
owned wheat to bring the price of wheat flour down to roughly the world market price. As of
January 1983, the United States price is about $100 higher then the world market level of approxi-
mately $175 a metric tone. Id
45 Id at col. 3. The sale will capture about two-thirds of the Egyptian wheat flour market. Id
46 Powell, "Real" GNP in '82 Fell .A, but '83 Growth Forecast, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1983, at 3,
col. 1.
47 Id
48 See U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., supra note 28, at 71. In 1941, the nation's rate of unem-
ployment was 10.9%, with 5.7 million people out of work. Id
49 Id
50 See Bacon, supra note 32.
51 See McGinley, Some Threats Economists See to Recovery, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1983, at 33,
col. 2; Schachter and Tryon, Protectionism in EC-US Trade Relations, 1978 INTERECONoMIcs, at
123.
52 In the Common Market, for example, the 1982 jobless rates ranged from 14.9% in Belgium,
11.9% in Britain, 11.4% in the Netherlands, and 11.2% in Italy to 9.5% in France and 7.7% in West
Germany. In total, about 11.6 million workers were unemployed in the 10-nation Common Mar-
ket. That figure is about 10.5% of the total work force, up from 4.5% in 1975 and less than 3% in
the 1960s. Zanker, Behind Mass Unemployment in Europe, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 31,
1983, at 82.
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economy.53 Sluggish economies abroad have severely hampered our
ability to increase employment in export industries. Yet Americans
should not forget that sixteen percent of the current factory jobs de-
pend on exports. 4 Moreover, while twenty percent of United States
manufactured goods are currently exported, forty percent of United
States agricultural produce is exported.5 United States Trade Repre-
sentative William E. Brock argued early in 1983 that five million
American jobs are directly related to exports, and some eight to ten
million more American jobs are indirectly related to exports. 6
The interconnection of imports and exports should be kept in
mind. Steps to restrict imports may indirectly restrict exports by invit-
ing retaliation from other nations.5 7  Thus, any security American
workers may enjoy from protectionism may be offset by decreased em-
ployment resulting from decreased exports. Indeed, since the labor
content of United States exports is greater than the labor content of
foreign imports, if retaliation abroad merely offsets the trade effects of
American protectionism there would be a net reduction in United
States employment.5 8 Further, if protectionism gets out of hand, the
United States and the rest of the world may find themselves in a 1930s-
style trade war, and a 1930s-like depression.59 With the stock market
crash of 1929, America's knee-jerk reaction was protectionism. After
the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,6° American ex-
ports fell from $5.5 billion in 1929 to $1.7 billion in 1932.61 Our trade
partners had simply retaliated. In short, just as the Smoot-Hawley
53 Ruttenberg, Development of Third World Would Affect U.S. Supply of Raw Materials,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1977, at 39, 40.
54 Bacon, supra note 32.
55 Id
56 Require U.S. Parts in Foreign Cars supra note 31.
57 Id
58 Hays and Willett, Two Economists' View Of The Casefor Trade Liberalization, COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus., Fall 1973, at 20, 25.
59 Require U.S. Parts in Foreign Cars supra note 31 (statement by Trade Rep. Brock); An
Interview with Nakasone, TiME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 54; see Long, The Protectionist Threat to World
Trade Relations, 1977 INTERECONoMics, at 283, 285; Joining the Subsidy Wars, Wall St. J., Feb.
24, 1983, at 26, col. 1. But see Bruce-Briggs, The Coming Overthrow ofFree Trade, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 24, 1983, at 26, col. 3 (arguing that just as a nation's national defense measures may be
accepted by its allies as sensible policy decisions, so a nation's trade protectionism may be per-
ceived by its trade partners as "merely sensible economic defense measures"). Mr. Bruce-Briggs
fails, however, to address the obvious distinction that whereas national defense measures gener-
ally do not threaten a nation's allies, trade protectionism invariably injures a nation's trade part-
ners. Cf Schachter and Tryon, supra note 51, at 126.
60 Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
61 Wilcke, Free Trade, Fair Trade: Prosperity and Economic Freedom, SPEAKING OF JAPAN,
Sept. 1982, at 8, 13 (published by the Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs).
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Tariff led foreign countries to retaliate by increasing their tariffs against
American goods, so large scale protectionism today would be self-de-
feating. Indeed, some economists have identified increased protection-
ism, along with a reescalation of interest rates, a slowdown in spending
and international financial problems, as a major obstacle along the
road to America's economic recovery.62
The Reagan administration appears to believe that its decision to
subsidize a huge wheat sale to Egypt is confined enough so as not to
spark a trade war with the Europeans.63 To date this belief has proven
correct.64 The administration has not been so lucky, however, with the
Chinese. On January 13, 1983, the United States announced that it was
freezing Chinese textile imports at current levels.65 Less than a week
later, China barred purchases of cotton, synthetic fibers and soybeans
from the United States, and announced that it intended to "reduce its
planned imports of other United States agricultural products. 66
China's retaliation sent tremors through United States grain markets.67
China imports more United States wheat than any other nation, about
one-sixth of United States wheat exports.68 Moreover, while China is
obligated by a long-term agreement to buy six million tons of United
States grain a year, China may now look to other nations to fill its
additional grain needs.69 Thus, China's natural response to our protec-
tionism illustrates that such policies are likely to be self-defeating.
IV. WORKING WITH FREE TRADE
Proponents of free trade often argue that lowering trade barriers,
such as tariffs and quotas, leads to lower market prices not only for
imported goods, but also for like goods produced domestically due to
62 McGinley, supra note 5 1.
63 Birnbaum, supra note 44.
64 Shortly after the sale was announced, the European Community said it would contest the
United States sale of subsidized flour to Egypt at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Common Market Sets GA77YProtest of U.S. Flour Sale to Egypt, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1983, at 20,
col. 3.
65 Ching, China Bars U.S. Cotton, Synthetic Fibers, Soybeans to Protest American Trade Curb,
Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1983, at 25, col. 3. This decision came after the two sides failed to agree in a
fourth round of negotiations on a new textiles agreement to replace the old agreement which had
expired December 31, 1982. Id
66 Id
67 Id
68 Id United States wheat exports account for 65% of the total United States production of
wheat. Id
69 Id In the past, China has required considerably more than six million tons of grain a year.
Id
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the increased competition.7" By paying lower prices, the American
consumer indirectly captures the economies enjoyed by importing na-
tions who possess comparative advantages in the relevant industries.
Since the early 1970s, however, many labor leaders have challenged the
applicability of the doctrine of comparative advantage in today's
world, and the concept of international specialization generally.71
They have argued that the flow of trade between borders no longer
simply involves firms of one nation dealing with firms of another na-
tion. Rather, multinational firms transfer to their American plants
goods produced overseas with cheaper labor and sell them in the
American market at American prices, thus making larger profits rather
than passing on their cost savings to American consumers.72
Even in the age of the multinational firm it is clear that the bene-
fits of free trade greatly exceed the costs. 73 For example, one economist
estimated in 1972 that eliminating tariffs on all imports other than
those subject to quotas would result in a long-run net gain to consum-
ers of about $1.4 billion annually.7 4 He concluded that quotas on pe-
troleum, steel, textiles, sugar, meat and dairy products result in a long-
run net cost of about $3.5 billion annually.75 Another economist esti-
mated in 1973 that petroleum quotas cost consumers $5 billion annu-
ally, textile quotas $2.5 to $4.8 billion annually, and sugar quotas $580
to $700 million annually.76
In addition, it is important to recognize that the benefits of free
trade will continue as long as free trade continues. By contrast, the
costs of free trade are limited.77 Import-affected workers, for example,
should only remain unemployed as long as it takes them to develop
70 Hays and Willett, supra note 58, at 21.
71 Shelton, The Changing Attitude of U.S. Labor Unions Toward World Trade, MONTHLY LAB.
REv., May 1970, at 51, 52.
72 Id at 53.
73 Hays and WiUett, supra note 58, at 23. The costs of free trade include: (1) temporary
unemployment as workers and resources are forced out of some industries by increased competi-
tion and attracted into others by new export opportunities; (2) reduction in domestic producers'
incomes as prices are lowered due to increased competition; and (3) reduction in government
revenues from the elimination of tariffs. Id at 21-22.
Noneconomic costs, such as to America's national security, are not considered in this Com-
ment. National security interests may justify some protectionism. See, e.g., Lewis, The Real Se-
curity Issue-Rice, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., June 19, 1981, at 70-71. But the "national
security" argument should not be used to justify broad-ranging protectionist measures unless the
threats to national security are correspondingly broad. See Policiesfor Adjustment: Some General
Orientations, THE OECD OBSERVER, July 1978, at 10, 11.
74 Hays and Willett, supra note 58, at 21.
75 Id
76 I. MINTz, U.S. IMPORT QUOTAS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 10 (1973).
77 Hays and Willett, supra note 58, at 22.
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marketable skills. Thus even if the costs of free trade exceeded the
benefits over several years, free trade still would be desirable over the
long run.78
Moreover, the primary focus of United States trade policy should
not be on imports, but on exports, for the more important benefits of
free trade are higher domestic productivity and greater exports. Com-
bined with an aggressive marketing strategy for exports, free trade cre-
ates jobs. In this regard, the Export Trading Company Act of 198271 is
a healthy beginning. This Act provides for the development of interna-
tional general trading companies, consortia of similar manufacturing
companies, so that their wares may be marketed more effectively
abroad. Japan's success in exporting goods is primarily a result of such
general trading companies, known there as sogoshosha.80 In fact, Ja-
pan's Mitsui Trading Company is the sixth largest exporter of Ameri-
can goods.81
Although our foreign trade partners have practiced protectionism,
the United States must restrain itself from reacting with trade barriers
of its own that would prostrate the Export Trading Company Act. The
potential of this Act for job creation in the United States cannot be
overemphasized. By helping small- and medium-sized firms crack new
export markets without large initial investments, the Act could help to
create between 200,000 and 400,000 jobs. 2
Moreover, despite the low income levels and low growth of the
Third World in the early 1970s, almost half of every dollar increase in
United States exports in those years came from developing nations.8 3
Today the growing affluence of the Third World continues to offer new
potential for United States exports and thus for the creation of Ameri-
can jobs.' In this regard, the United States should be commended for
its proposal at the November 1982 meeting of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to begin a new round of talks between developed
and developing nations, aimed at getting each to open more of their
78 Id
79 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982).
80 Dziubla, International Trading Companies: Building On The Japanese Aodel, 4 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 422, 423 (1982).
81 Id
82 JOBS-Puling America Back to Work, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1982, at 78, 91. See generally
Dziubla, supra note 80.
83 Americas Labor's Stake In A Changing World Economy, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1977,
at 34, 37.
84 Choate and Epstein, supra note 36.
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markets to the other.
8 5
V. THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF WORKER ADJUSTMENT
ASSISTANCE
Traditional trade barriers are antiquated. While the escape
clause,86 for example, may provide industry-wide relief, the better rem-
edy for import-related injuries is assistance targeted to only those
workers and firms adversely affected by liberal trade policies.8 7 This
argument assumes that assistance directed specifically to disruptions
caused by imports will cost less nationally than tariffs and quotas.
More fundamentally, raising tariffs or imposing quotas is not always
the better remedy for individual workers or firms in an adversely af-
fected industry. 8 Abandoning liberalized trade policies does not
guarantee firms needed capital to diversify or change lines of produc-
tion, nor does it guarantee workers needed retraining and assistance in
relocating. 9 Indeed, for the worker, the escape clause remedy may
provide only cosmetic relief, enabling him to work a while longer in an
industry that is suffering a permanent decline due to comparative
disadvantage.90
A comprehensive plan for targeting federal assistance to import-
affected workers and firms was first proposed in 1954 by David J. Mc-
Donald, president of the United Steelworkers of America.91 The pro-
posal, as submitted by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy,
called for retraining and relocation benefits for workers, as well as ex-
tended unemployment compensation. 92 Capsulizing the underlying
theory of the McDonald adjustment assistance plan, a commentator
wrote in 1956:
Transfer of resources is the guiding purpose of the McDonald plan. It
85 Pine, Trade Ministers Promise to Avoid New Curbs, Shrink Existing Ones, Wall St. J., Nov.
29, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
86 The underlying notion of this concept is that "escape" from trade-related injuries should be
available to American firms. If trade liberalization results in undue harm to American firms or
workers, such policy is abandoned. A 1947 executive order by President Truman established this
remedy as part of the United States trade agreements program. C. FRANK, FOREIGN TRADE AND
DOMESTIC Am 2 (1977). It was later codified in the Trade Agreements Act of 1951, and is en-
dorsed in Article 19 of the GATT. Id
87 1 U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT POL'Y, UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 322-23 (1971).
88 Id
89 C. FRANK, supra note 86.
90 See id
91 Id at3.




aims to help investors, management and workers to shift their capital and
their skills out of industries injured or threatened by foreign competition
and into branches of manufacturing or other economic activities where
they would be more effective and less vulnerable. Thus the plan would
supplement and reinforce a basic purpose of tariff reduction, viz., to raise
the general level of productivity of the American economy.
93
By 1954, therefore, the concept of worker adjustment assistance had
entered American politics. The theory was that through supplemental
unemployment insurance, retraining, job search grants and relocation
allowances, import-affected workers would gain employment in more
promising industries, with benefits accruing both to them and to the
general economy. Thus the "adjustment" intended by McDonald was
the transfer of workers out of domestic industries in a condition of per-
manent decline due to comparative disadvantage, to existing or new
industries in fields in which the United States possesses a comparative
advantage.
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy rejected the Mc-
Donald plan, however, because it determined that import-affected
workers were no more deserving of a special program than any other
group of unemployed workers. The Commission said:
[N]o matter how great our sympathy may be for the problems of a dis-
placed worker, . . . this is but one phase of a much broader problem
.... In a free economy, some displacement of workers ... is unavoida-
ble. It may come about through technological change, alterations in con-
sumer preferences, exhaustion of a mineral resource, new inventions, new
taxes, or many other causes. Since it has never been seriously proposed
that the burden of all such injury arising in a free economy should be
assumed by the Government, the Commission felt that it was not appro-
priate to propose such a plan in the tariff area only.94
Despite the Commission's rejection of the McDonald plan, the
concept of worker adjustment assistance soon gained many adherents
in Congress. By the end of 1954, an adjustment assistance bill, incor-
porating many features of the McDonald plan, had been introduced in
the House.9" Similar bills were proposed in 1955 in the Senate by sena-
tors Kennedy and Humphrey.96 Between 1954 and the early 1960s,
numerous adjustment assistance bills were introduced in Congress.97
In 1962, with the passage of the Trade Expansion Act (TEA),98
93 P. BIDWELL, WHAT THE TARIFF MEANs TO AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 274 (1956).
94 U.S. COMM'N ON FOREIGN ECON. PoL'Y, supra note 92, at 54.
95 P. BDwELL, supra note 93.
96 Id
97 See Clubb and Reisher, The TradeAdjustment Bills: Their Purpose & Effcacy, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 490 (1961); U.S. COM?'N ON IN 'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT Por'y, supra note 87, at 323.
98 Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
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adjustment assistance became, at least ostensibly, a reality for the
American worker.9 9 The Act's provision for worker adjustment assist-
ance was essential in generating support from labor for the Act.'" °
The worker adjustment assistance program under the TEA was a
complete failure. Between 1962 and late 1969 not a single worker re-
ceived adjustment assistance. 0 1 Between December 1969 and April
1975,102 $86 million was dispensed to workers in the form of supple-
mental unemployment insurance. 10 3 But a mere $3 million was spent
99 The TEA created, with the adjustment assistance program for workers, a program for ad-
justment assistance for firms adversely affected by increased imports. Loans and loan guarantees,
tax breaks, and technical assistance such as managerial advice and research and development
assistance, were offered under the Act. Strict eligibility criteria and a large number of administra-
tive procedures, however, prohibited all but the most declining and poorly managed firms from
eligibility. C. FRANK, supra note 86, at 58.
100 Id at 3-4. Organized labor generally supported liberal trade legislation until the late 1960s.
Id at 4. The economy was booming during most of the early and middle 1960s, and the instances
of trade-related injury to American workers were relatively infrequent. See id at 46.
101 Id at 45. It must be noted, however, that 1,943 trade-impacted workers in the automotive
industry received adjustment assistance under the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-283, 79 Stat. 1016 (codified at 119 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2033 (1976)). C. FRANK, supra note
86, at 57.
The authority to provide adjustment assistance under this Act was limited to three years, and
expired in 1968. See 19 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1970) (obsolete). Such limited authority was intended
to remedy problems arising from the creation of a tariff-free United States-Canadian market for
automotive parts. See id For a review of the Act, see Manley, Adjustment Assistance: Experience
Under the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 10 HARV. INT'L L. J. 294 (1969); Metzger, The
United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965, 1 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 103
(1967).
The general view is that adjustment assistance under this Act was more successful than ad-
justment assistance under the TEA, since benefits were at least doled out under it while the TEA
lay idle. The explanation given is that the 1965 Act focused on a single industry, involved less
severe eligibility criteria, and enjoyed more lenient administrative interpretations. See, e.g., Ro-
senblatt, TradeAdstment Assistance Programs: Crossroads or Dead End?, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1065, 1070 (1977). For a discussion of eligibility criteria under the TEA, see Comment, "In
Major Part"--he New Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements Program, 44 TEx. L. R .
1331 (1966); Note, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: A Will-O" he-
Wisp, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1088, 1102-03 (1965).
102 The worker adjustment assistance program under the TEA expired in April 1975. C.
FRANK, supra note 86, at 49.
103 Id at 53. The transfer of human resources out of the automobile industry to another indus-
try was probably not achieved under the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. Of the $4.1
million expended under this adjustment assistance program, nearly all of it went to the import-
affected worker through supplemental unemployment compensation, rather than through retrain-
ing or relocation benefits. Id at 57.
It must be further noted that while the transfer of human resources into industries enjoying
comparative advantage was a goal under the TEA, it was not its exclusive goal. Section 326(b) of
the Act, for example, required the Secretary of Labor to attempt to develop a worker retraining
plan with the import-affected firm or worker's union, thus keeping the worker associated with the
firm and in the area of his residence. See Note, Title I of the Trade Act of 1974: What Changes
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on reemployment services during that period."° Thus, by the expira-
tion of the program, 35,000 workers had actually received adjustment
assistance. 10 5 Yet only approximately 3,500 workers had received
placement services or retraining, and less than 125 workers had re-
ceived relocation allowances.106
With the passage of the Trade Act of 1974,107 Congress believed
that it had designed a new worker adjustment assistance program that
would focus on reemployment services.' Thus, in addition to easing
the eligibility criteria for supplemental unemployment compensation,
Congress added new "measures aimed at helping adversely affected
workers to find new employment, including job search, training and
relocation allowances."' 109
By 1980, however, the new program under the Trade Act of 1974
was generally recognized as having failed as abysmally as the program
under the TEA. The Senate Finance Committee, after considering
amendments to the program in 1981, reported:
The program clearly has not functioned as intended. In a study released
in January 1980 the General Accounting Office found that... weekly
... cash payments have helped very few unemployed workers adjust to
Hath Congress Wrought to Reliefrom Injury Caused by Import Competition?, 10 J. INT'L L. &
EcON. 197, 222-23 (1975). This requirement was dropped under the Trade Act of 1974. Id
It should be pointed out, however, that the transfer of human resources into industries en-
joying comparative advantage may be achieved solely within a large, diversified firm. Comment,
Letting Obsolete Firns Die: Trade Adjustment Assistance in the United States and Japan, 22 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 595, 607 (1981). This is currently done in Japan, where large firms typically seek to
retrain their permanent employees even during recessions. Id; see C. FRANK, supra note 86, at
144.
104 C. FRANK, supra note 86, at 53.
105 Id
106 Id
107 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976)),
amended by Pub. L. No. 97-35 §§ 2501-2529, 95 Stat. 881-93 (1981). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2394 (portions of the 1974 Act outlining import relief procedures). With the exception of tax
assistance, the Trade Act continued to offer the same assistance to adversely affected firms as
under the TEA. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONGY. & AD. NEWS 7186 [hereinafter cited as S. REp. No. 1298]. For further information on TEA
benefits see supra note 99. Procedures for certifying proposals for adjustment assistance were
simplified, and the qualifying criteria significantly relaxed. S. RP. No. 1298, at 7284.
108 The staff of the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means has
explained that "[t]he basic purpose of a program of benefits to trade-impacted workers. .. is to
assist their adjustment to reemployment in the same or different industry, as opposed to producing
compensation for unemployment." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON THE TRADE ADJUST-
MENT ASSISTANCE PROORAMs UNDER TITLE II OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 14 (Comm. Print
1977) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND MATERIALS].
109 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 107, at 7205. See the appendix for an outline of the procedure
and benefits under the current program.
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their changed circumstances. Of the. . recipients interviewed, 85 per-
cent had returned to work, 67 percent for the same employer who laid
them off. . . Seventy-three percent of those surveyed used none of the
employment services, job search and relocation allowances because they
were not aware the services were available to them, they had little need
for the services, and they were not willing to move to take advantage of a
job in another community."'
Congress also noted in 1981 that local officials believed that the cash
payments under the program, which in many instances were well above
state unemployment insurance levels, created a disincentive for some
import-affected workers to seek new careers.1 ' As a result, the program
was amended in 1981 to provide supplemental unemployment compen-
sation only after import-affected workers have exhausted their entitle-
ment to state unemployment insurance. 1 12 Moreover, the 1981
amendments to the Trade Act limited the weekly amount payable
under the program to the weekly amount payable under state unem-
ployment insurance programs." 3
The 1981 amendments also provided some teeth to the theory un-
110 S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 534, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
396, 801 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 139].
111 Id
112 The maximum number of weeks of combined state unemployment compensation and cash
benefits under the worker adjustment assistance program is 52 weeks. An additional 26 weeks of
cash benefits, however, may be provided to help an import-affected worker complete an approved
training program. 19 U.S.C. §2293(a)(l)-(3) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
To be eligible for adjustment assistance, an import-affected worker must have 26 weeks or
more of employment at a weekly wage of $30 or more in adversely affected employment with a
single firm or subdivision of a firm. 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), amending 19 U.S.C.
§ 2291(2) (1976). Under the 1981 amendments, the 26 week pre-layoff employment requirement
has been liberalized so that qualifying weeks include up to three weeks of employer-authorized
leave for vacation, sickness, injury, maternity, military service, or service as a full-time union
representative; or up to seven weeks of disability covered by workers' compensation; or up to
seven weeks combining disability leave and not more than three weeks of employer-authorized or
union leave. Id
The 26 week pre-layoff employment requirement appears to have been assiduously upheld.
For example, in Felyn v. Commonwealth, Unemployrment Compensation Bd of Review, - Pa.
Commw. -, 445 A.2d 847 (1982), the petitioner had been employed as a tire builder by a tire
company for over I 1 years. Id at -, 445 A.2d at 848. For most of the year preceding his layoff,
however, he was absent from work due to a work-related injury. Id Citing a series of cases where
the court held that work-related absences should not be counted as weeks of employment, Id at
-, 445 A.2d at 849, the court found that Felcyn was ineligible for adjustment assistance. Id at -,
445 A.2d at 850. The court noted, however, that Felcyn would have been eligible for assistance
had he been covered under the 1981 amendments. Id at -, 445 A.2d at 850 n.5.
113 The Senate Finance Committee reported that this limitation "will achieve a greater equity
between those who are unemployed as a result of trade impact and those unemployed for other
reasons." S. REP. No. 139, supra note 110, at 802. Under these limitations, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that outlays for cash benefits will fall from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1981
to $118 million in fiscal year 1982. CONG. BUDGET OFF., DISLOCATED WORKERS: ISSUES AND




derlying the worker adjustment assistance program. The Secretary of
Labor was authorized to order all import-affected workers in a labor
market area to enter an available training program or extend their job
search beyond the area.1 4 Cash payments under the program would
be cut off if the worker did not comply with the order."'
The future of worker adjustment assistance is uncertain. The cur-
rent program expires at the end of September 1983.116 This renders
timely and, indeed, necessary an analysis of whether the federal gov-
ernment should fund a special program for import-affected workers
and, if so, what that program should provide, and how it should oper-
ate. Before such analysis, however, it is important to discuss the major
defects of the worker adjustment assistance programs to date.
VI. ELIGIBILITY FOR ADJUSTMENT AsSISTANCE
A. Exclusion of Service & Components Workers
The worker adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Act of
1974 give an exceedingly vague mandate. The terms "article" and
"like or directly competitive," for example, are crucially important for
import-affected workers petitioning for certification. 1 7  Yet Congress
did not define these terms in the Act. As a result, the Trade Act has
been interpreted to exclude service and component-parts workers from
the program.
In Fortin v. Marshall,' 8 the petitioners were former workers of
Pan American World Airways' Boston operation. In 1978, the Civil
Aeronautics Board stripped Pan Am of its Detroit-Boston-London
route, and named Trans World Airlines as the single American airline
to provide service from Boston to London.' 19 The cause of this transfer
"4 19 U.S.C. § 2291(b) (Supp. V 1981).
115 Before such an order may be issued, however, the state employment security office must
determine that high unemployment exists in the worker's labor market area, and that no suitable
employment opportunities are available there. Although the Trade Act of 1974 provides that the
Secretary shall make this determination, id, in fact the state employment security office makes
such determination as the Secretary's agent. Telephone interview with Joseph E. Wojcik, Man-
ager, Insured Federal Programs Unit, Illinois Department of Labor (Mar. 14, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Wojcik Interview].
Of 1,338,090 workers who were certified for adjustment assistance between 1975 and 1981,
only 48,811 entered training programs. Moreover, only 9,795 received job search or relocation
allowances. Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program, 1981-82, 201, 203 (1982) [hereinafter cited as President's Report].
116 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
118 608 F.2d 525 (Ist Cir. 1979).
119 Id at 526.
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of authority was a trade agreement the United States had entered into
with Great Britain.' 20 Soon British Airways dramatically increased its
share of the Boston-London market. 12 1 After other routes from Boston
proved unprofitable, Pan Am closed down its Boston operation.'
22
The issue in Fortin was whether the service Pan Am sold could be
considered an "article" for purposes of the Trade Act.' 23 This issue
was fundamental because the Secretary of Labor must find that in-
creases of imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles
produced by petitioners' firm caused the petitioners' separations.' 24
The First Circuit expressed sympathy with the plight of the work-
ers in this case, 125 but said that it is "clear that the term 'article' was
plainly meant to refer to a tangible thing and not to a service."' 26 The
court reasoned that although the term "commerce" was intended in the
Act to include services associated with international trade,127 and the
term "international trade" was intended to include trade in both goods
and services, 128 Congress used those terms when it meant "services"
but "article" when it meant "a thing.'
129
Legislative disparity of treatment among import-affected workers
was also identified by the Sixth Circuit in Morristown Magnavox For-
mer Employees v. Marshall.3 Involved here was a Magnavox Corpo-
ration plant which produced only electronic components for Magnavox
color televisions.' In August 1979 the plant closed, displacing 575
workers.1 3 2 Prior to the closing, in 1976, Japanese imports of color tele-
vision sets increased 179.8% over the previous year.133 These imports,
plus those in 1978 and 1979, caused an enormous displacement of
American color television sales.'34 The petitioners alleged, therefore,







124 See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
125 608 F.2d at 529.
126 Id at 527.
127 See 19 U.S.C. § 2481(10)(1976).
128 19 U.S.C. § 2112(g) (1976).
129 608 F.2d at 527.
130 671 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1982).
131 Id at 195.
132 Id
133 Id at 196.
134 Id




The Sixth Circuit, however, did not consider whether increased
imports of color television sets was an important cause of the closing of
the Magnavox plant.'36 Rather, the court affirmed the Secretary's de-
nial of certification on the narrow ground that the Trade Act requires
that the petitioners must have produced an article for which the de-
mand was decreased by the importation of a like article.'37 The court
held that "like" must be construed to mean "identical."' 38 In other
words, although the workers may have been adversely affected by the
increased importation of color television sets, they were not entitled to
adjustment assistance because they only produced component parts of
color television sets. They could not obtain adjustment assistance un-
less the increased importation of like components caused their
separation.
Recognizing the harsh result in this case, the Sixth Circuit blamed
Congress: "While it seems clear to us that the petitioners here may
have suffered loss of jobs from the general impact on the television
market of foreign competition, it does not appear that Congress has
ever provided adjustment [assistance]" to workers who produced only a
component of a product, when the foreign competition complained of
involved the importation of the finished product. 39  Moreover, the
court emphasized, "Congress ha[s] made a policy decision and drawn a
line; our duty is to give the language of the statute a meaning that will
carry out that policy."' 4
The District of Columbia Circuit has also expressed dissatisfaction
with the Trade Act's apparent components exclusion. In Machine
Printers & Engravers Association of United States v. Marshall,14 a
union alleged that its members were losing work because increased im-
ports of textile fabrics had reduced the demand for the engraved rollers
produced by their employers.' 42 No increase in the importation of en-
graved rollers was alleged.' 43 Although it affirmed the Secretary's de-
nial of adjustment assistance, the court said:
The business of the workers' employers has been hurt by the imports of
textile fabrics .... The Union's claim and the workers' apparent plight
should and do provoke sympathy .... We are bound, however, by what
Congress has enacted and our interpretation of it is authoritatively con-





141 595 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
142 Id at 861.
143 Id
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trolled by the decision of this court on an earlier petition seeking a gener-
ous interpretation of the present statute. United Shoe Workers ofAmerica,
AFL-CIO v. Bedell, 165 U.S. App. D.C. 113, 506 F.2d 174 (1974).' 4
Whether the circuit court's interpretation of the Trade Act of 1974
in Machine Printers was controlled by its decision in Bedell is question-
able, since Bedell involved an interpretation of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962.145 The court should have recognized that Congress ex-
pressed a new attitude toward import-affected workers in the Trade Act
by relaxing the qualifying criteria for certification.
146
Both Machine Printers and Morristown suggest that Congress gave
careful thought to the meaning of the term "like or directly competi-
tive," and intended to incorporate the substance of the Bedell decision
into the statute. 47 In reality, however, the legislative history of the
Trade Act included only a single, neutral reference to Bedell:
The Committee notes that the term "like or directly competitive" as used
in ... the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has been the subject of recent
court action. The courts ... concluded that imported finished articles
are not like or directly competitive with domestic component parts
thereof. United Shoe Workers of America, et al. v. Catherine Bedell, et al
148
Far from showing that Congress gave careful thought to the substance
of Bedell, this citation appears to have been designed to show mere
awareness, not approval, of the decision. 149 Moreover, this reference to
Bedell is scarcely the type of congressional mandate that precludes a
court's reinterpretation of the term.150
B. State Administration
While the worker adjustment assistance program is conducted
under the auspices of the United States Department of Labor, it is ad-
ministered through state employment security offices. 15 1 This dual-
level administrative structure frustrates the formulation of a uniform
national program. For example, under the rule that all questions of
individual eligibility and unemployment insurance law shall be left to
144 Id at 861-62.
145 506 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
146 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
147 See Machine Printers, supra note 141, at 862; Morristown, supra note 130, at 197.
148 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 107, at 7266.
149 The Secretary of Labor has argued that by citing Bedell in the Trade Act's legislative his-
tory, Congress intended to incorporate the substance of the decision into the Act. Cprek, Worker
Adjustment Assistance: Black Comedy in the Post-Renaissance, 11 LAW & PoI.'Y INt'L Bus. 593,
610-11 (1979).
150 Id at 610 n.44.
Is See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
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the states, 152 a worker covered by a certification who accepts an early
retirement may or may not receive adjustment assistance-depending
on the state in which he resides.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, the only state supreme court to
deal with an adjustment assistance issue, recently struggled with the
vexing question of early retirements. In Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Ag-
salud,153 the court was faced with a determination by the state that two
workers were ineligible for adjustment assistance because they had ac-
cepted early retirement.154 Reversing, the high court said that the ap-
pellants, supervisory employees of Wailuku Sugar Company, had
reason to believe that some supervisory employees would be laid off
since the firm's work force had been recently reduced due to foreign
sugar competition.1 55 The court emphasized that the appellants' em-
ployer had, for "a little better pension," invited them to retire early,
"appealing to their loyalty to the company and to their concern for
younger supervisory employees who had young wives and children to
support and who might otherwise be laid off without the appellants'
pension advantages." 156 Therefore, the court found that the appellants'
early retirement was not voluntary, but "was due to pressure and per-
suasion on the part of the employer, and to the circumstances ....
By contrast, in York v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Se-
curity Divsion,158 the Indiana Court of Appeals, faced with fact situa-
tions similar to Wailuku Sugar, affirmed the denial of adjustment
assistance to the workers. 59 Here the court consolidated the separate
appeals of York and Lazar, both of whom had accepted early retire-
ment from Ford Motor Company.'60
York, who had worked as a process engineer for over sixteen
years, was given five days to accept an early retirement offer.'61 Al-
though he had rejected numerous other early retirement offers with os-
tensibly no retaliation, this time Ford told him that his job function was
152 19 U.S.C. § 2294 (1976). Under this provision, the Secretary of Labor may make exceptions
to state unemployment insurance law for import-affected workers. In practice, however, individ-
ual eligibility may be challenged only under state procedures applicable to normal unemployment
insurance claims. Cprek, supra note 149, at 687 n.312.
153 - Hawaii--, 648 P.2d 1107 (1982).
154 ld at-, 648 P.2d at 1109.
155 Id at-, 648 P.2d at 1111.
156 Id
157 Id at-, 648 P.2d at 1111-12.
158 - Ind. App. -, 425 N.E.2d 707 (1981).
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being transferred to Detroit within eight months, and reminded him of
his low seniority. 6 2 When Ford approached Lazar, a superintendent
of quality control, the firm reminded him that many jobs had been
eliminated, and that it was trying to reduce its work force due to pro-
ductivity problems.'63 After accepting Ford's offer, he tried to retract
his acceptance, but Ford refused to cooperate.'"
Noting that the purpose of the Indiana Employment Security Act
was to provide benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of
their own, the court held that "York and Lazar voluntarily accepted
retirement and are ineligible to receive TRA benefits."' 65 Earlier in the
opinion, the court had said that the workers were not entitled to their
early retirement bonuses unless they accepted Ford's offer, and that
they were free to refuse the offer and continue working under their
prior employment contracts.1
66
Thus, in reviewing the administration of the worker adjustment
assistance program, one state court has recognized that a potential early
retiree may have little real choice other than accepting a bonus for
signing some retirement papers.' 67 On the other hand, another state
court has held that since the potential early retiree could have contin-
ued working at least until he was laid off, his separation was voluntary.
The disqualifying provisions of state unemployment insurance law
apply only to applications for cash payments, not to applications for re-
employment services.' 68 Yet cash payments are perhaps the only form
of adjustment assistance in which older workers, who are more vulner-
able to early retirement offers, 169 may be interested. Their learning a
new skill may be unduly onerous, especially as compared to younger
162 Id
163 Id
164 Id Moreover, Lazar believed that the section in which he worked would be combined with
another section. He feared that if this happened, he would lose his job classification, which could
have resulted in a $375 per month loss in income. Id
165 Id at--, 425 N.E.2d at 711.
166 Id
167 In this regard, it is important to point out that since older workers are frequently less pro-
ductive than younger workers, an employer may find it advantageous to offer early retirement to
older workers at a slight cost in order to maintain a younger and more productive work force.
168 19 U.S.C. § 2294 (1976) ("State law. . . shall apply to any such worker who files a claim
for trade readjustment allowances"). "Trade readjustment allowances" are adjustment assistance
in the form of cash payments.
169 See supra note 167. Moreover, one scholar has argued that the average age of import-
affected workers is much higher than the average age of all other unemployed workers: "about 44
years in the case of import-affected workers as compared to 32 years for all unemployed workers."
Frank, The United States Needs A BetterAdjustmentAssistance Program, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.,




workers doing the same task. Their residential roots may be deeper
also, making their relocation a greater sacrifice. Therefore, Congress
should implement a national standard on the perplexing issue of volun-
tariness of resignations so that the worker adjustment assistance pro-
gram may be more uniformly and equitably administered. 7 '
Moreover, Congress should not leave to state agencies the difficult
task of interpreting whether a worker must be laid off directly from an
import-affected subdivision of a firm to qualify for adjustment assist-
ance. 17 In Dewhirst v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division,172 the state agency strictly construed the Trade Act to require
that a worker must be laid off directly from an adversely affected subdi-
vision of a firm.17 Involved here was a sheet mill division of United
States Steel Corporation that had been found by the Secretary to be
adversely affected by imports. 174  Dewhirst had worked in the sheet
mill division for over two years but, two weeks before his layoff, was
transferred to a tin mill division that had not been found to be ad-
versely affected. 75  Stressing the troublesome fact situation, the court
said that Dewhirst was totally separated from the adversely affected
sheet mill division at the time of his layoff, although he was technically
laid off from the tin mill division. 176  It therefore reversed the state
agency's denial of adjustment assistance.177 The court noted that al-
though "the statutory language is unclear, not expressly requiring lay-
170 A recent study has shown that of 13,400 offers of early retirement made at 26 United States
firms in 1982, 4,100 were accepted. Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 5. See generally Sheller, As
More Firms Nudge Out Employees, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1983, at 65 (more and
more firms are encouraging older workers to retire early).
171 Under the Trade Act of 1974, a worker must have 26 weeks or more of employment at a
weekly wage of $30 or more "in adversely affected employment with a single firm or subdivision
of a firm" to be eligible for adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), amend-
ing 19 U.S.C. § 2291(2) (1976).
172 - Ind. App. -, 419 N.E.2d 150 (1981).
173 Id at-, 419 N.E.2d at 152.
174 Id at-, 419 N.E.2d at 151.
175 Id
176 Id at-, 419 N.E.2d at 153.
177 Id at-, 419 N.E.2d at 154. For another example of a state court reversing a state agency's
strict interpretation of the Trade Act, see Anderson v. Review Bd of nd Employment Sec. Div., -
Ind. App. -, 412 N.E.2d 819 (1980). There the Indiana employment security office had denied
Anderson cash benefits because it read the Trade Act to require a certified worker to have 26
weeks of employment with a single firm after the impact date identified in the certification. Id at
-, 412 N.E.2d at 821. See supra note 112, infra note 241. This interpretation would have the
practical effect of denying cash benefits to all workers who were unable to retain their jobs for
one-half year after the Department of Labor had determined that their firms had suffered absolute
decreases in sales or production, and that a substantial number of workers were losing or about to
lose their jobs. See infra notes 236-37, 241 and accompanying text. Recognizing that Congress
had eased the eligibility criteria in the Trade Act, the court reversed and said that Anderson was
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off from the firm directly from the adversely affected subdivision, we
believe that the statutory scheme contemplates such direct layoff as the
usual way in which separation will occur."' 178
The Secretary of Labor has arguably expressed his position on the
Dewhirst issue before the Seventh Circuit. In Paden v. United States
Department of Labor,'7 9 the Secretary argued that subsection 2272(3)
of the Trade Act 8' should be strictly construed to require that a worker
must be laid off directly from an adversely affected subdivision of a
firm.' Involved in Paden was a color television subdivision of Motor-
ola Corporation that had been closed, and whose workers were certi-
fied.' 82 The Secretary determined, however, that November 1, 1975
was the termination date of the certification. 83 Petitioners had worked
in the color television subdivision but, prior to November 1, 1975, had
been transferred to another subdivision that had not been found to be
adversely affected, and from which they were subsequently laid off. 84
Agreeing with the Secretary, the Seventh Circuit said in effect that
the color television subdivision workers, once transferred, were com-
pletely divorced from the ill effects of increased imports that the subdi-
vision had suffered.' 85 The court said that to become eligible for
adjustment assistance, the petitioners must obtain a determination from
the Secretary that an important cause of their ultimate separation was
increased imports of articles like or directly competitive with the arti-
cles produced by their new subdivision.'86 Given the conflicting
messages of Dewhirst and Paden, Congress should clarify whether a
worker must be laid off directly from an adversely affected subdivision
of a firm in order to qualify for adjustment assistance.
The worker adjustment assistance program would become a more
uniform national program if the responsibility for administering it were
shifted from the states back to its source, the federal government. In
addition, there are two other reasons a federally administered program
is desirable. First, in dispensing adjustment assistance other than cash
required only to have one-half year's employment out of the year preceding his separation from
his firm. - Ind. App. at -, 412 N.E.2d at 823.
178 - Ind. App. at -, 419 N.E.2d at 153 n.3.
179 562 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1977).
180 19 U.S.C. § 2272(3) (1976). This subsection is distinct from but analogous in language to
the subsection at issue in Dewhirst, 19 U.S.C. § 2291(2) (1976).
181 562 F.2d at 475-76. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
182 562 F.2d at 475.
183 Id at 475 n.6. See infra note 241.
184 562 F.2d at 475.




payments, state employment security offices have focused inadequately
on the needs of import-affected workers. Congress has established a
special program in the belief that the nature of employment dislocation
resulting from foreign competition necessitates that import-affected
workers be provided the opportunities to develop new skills in promis-
ing fields, and search out and relocate in promising areas of the nation.
To provide these opportunities, it has authorized the Secretary of La-
bor to enter into cooperative agreements with state agencies. As the
Secretary's agents, cooperating state agencies are obliged to identify
and serve the needs of import-affected workers.
Yet although they have faithfully implemented the cash payments
facet of the program, they have been unwilling to implement effectively
the heart of the program, the reemployment services facet. 187 Training,
job search and relocation benefits are bound to go unused unless there
is some outreach to import-affected workers. To encourage import-
affected workers to take advantage of these benefits, however, may re-
quire state agencies to advertise their reemployment services more to
those workers than to other unemployed workers. This would require
the agencies to differentiate among their unemployed clients on the ba-
sis of the reasons for their unemployment, something the agencies have
been reluctant to do.
188
Second, national administration of the worker adjustment assist-
ance program would bring to the program a national perspective.
Since entire industries may be adversely affected by increased imports,
workers may not have realistic opportunities to find new employment
in these industries. Moreover, the affected industries may be concen-
trated in a particular state, thereby compounding the difficulties of ab-
sorbing the import-affected worker into other types of employment.
189
Yet states may naturally resist the movement of human and capital
resources out of their jurisdictions. 90 Therefore, state agencies may in-
tentionally deemphasize job search grants and relocation allowances.
The federal government, on the other hand, would be less likely to suc-
cumb to local interests.
187 See generally Rosenblatt, supra note 101, at 1082 (helpful criticism of state administration
of the program).
188 Id See BACKGROUND MATERIALs, supra note 108, at 24. With the 1981 amendments, the
state employment offices are in a better position to encourage the use of reemployment services.
They may not cut off a worker's cash benefits unless he enters a training program or extends his
job search beyond the area. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
189 See generally S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 107, at 7273.
190 See Letting Obsolete Firmr Die, supra note 103, at 616.
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C. Conclusions
While it still may be unclear whether import-affected workers
should be singled out as deserving a separate program of assistance, if
there is to be a special assistance program for import-affected workers,
an attempt must be made to avoid unfairly discriminating among those
workers. Worker adjustment assistance must be designed and adminis-
tered more equitably. Service workers and component-parts workers
should not be excluded. More consideration must be given to workers
who are transferred from adversely affected subdivisions, and subse-
quently laid off.
Finally, for the sake of uniformity as well as improved program
effectiveness, the administrative responsibility for the program must
shift to the federal government. Uniformity with regard to the problem
of early retirees, for example, will then result. More important, given
the underlying theory of adjustment assistance, reemployment serv-
ices-like training, job search grants and relocation allowances-will
then be more effectively emphasized with a national perspective.
VII. THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL PROGRAM
With the worker adjustment assistance program under the Trade
Act of 1974 about to expire, the fundamental question of whether this
concept is a fair and useful approach for dealing with unemployment
resulting from increased imports naturally arises.
A. Fairness
The benefits of free trade are widely distributed throughout our
nation's economy, while the costs are borne by a relatively small group
of industries and workers. Thus free trade causes a redistribution of
welfare that appears unfair to many. As a result, worker adjustment
assistance has been designed as a program to spread the costs over soci-
ety as a whole in the form of expenditures to retrain import-affected
workers for new jobs.
In this sense, worker adjustment assistance is simply another ap-
plication of the familiar principle that any governmental policy, pre-
sumed to be of net benefit to the nation as a whole, should not impose
disproportionate costs on limited segments of society.'91 Under this
principle, adjustment assistance takes the form of "just compensation"
for a "taking" of American jobs for a public purpose. Indeed, this
191 C. FRANK, supra note 86, at 12.
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analogy has been used by the District of Columbia Circuit Court,
which has said:
Congress was of the view that fairness demanded some mechanism
whereby the national public, which realizes an overall gain througli trade
readjustments, can compensate the particular ... workers who suffer a
loss-much as the doctrine of eniment domain requires compensation
when private property is taken for public use.
192
Isolating those workers whose jobs have been truly "taken"
through liberal trade policies, however, is a fundamental problem that
calls into question the fairness and utility of the program. Indeed, the
program's fairness rationale is belied by the program's administration.
Increased car imports have displaced many American workers who had
assembled domestic cars. 193 These workers are eligible for adjustment
assistance. Similarly, auto assembly plant closures have "caused a
wave of closings of factories that build engines, stamp sheet metal and
fabricate other parts, many of them big operations in their own
right."'194 Yet these workers are not eligible for adjustment assistance,
since the Trade Act has been interpreted to exclude component-parts
workers. 195 Moreover, it is impossible to quantify what "just compen-
sation" import-affected workers deserve. A strict determination of this
would require the quantification of the gains to the public welfare from
liberalized trade policies, less the losses import-affected workers have
suffered.
Finally, import-affected workers may have no greater claim for
special assistance than do other groups of workers who are made job-
less by regular market forces. 196 Just as some unemployment undoubt-
edly results from liberalized trade policies, so some unemployment
undoubtedly results from other governmental policies. For example, if
the federal government abandoned its arms production programs, the
jobs of thousands of workers in defense industries would be jeopard-
ized. Many would be laid off. Yet it is hard to imagine that Congress
would determine that this group of displaced workers deserves more
extensive governmental assistance than other groups. Indeed, the
United States is the only nation in the world that isolates import-af-
192 U4WYv. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This case is known as "UAW I." For
"UAW II," see U.4W v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
193 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
194 Wall St. J., supra note 25.
195 See supra notes 139, 141-44 and accompanying text.
196 See Millen, Providing Assistance to Displaced Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1979, at
17, 20; supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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fected workers for special treatment. 197 Most Western European coun-
tries, for example, provide training, relocation and cash benefits to all
unemployed.198
In sum, the ultimate justification for worker adjustment assistance
is probably not fairness, despite the redistribution it does accomplish,
but a political one. 199 Politicians have recognized that the program les-
sens the political impact of liberalized trade.
B. The Politics of Adjustment Assistance
Vying for pre-primary advantage, presidential aspirants Mondale
and Glenn are campaigning with firm promises to get tough on foreign
competition.2 °° Suffering intolerably high unemployment, Americans
are on the bandwagon against our foreign trade partners. With so
many foreign cars on the road it is easy to imagine the great outflow of
car sales profits that would otherwise accrue ultimately to the benefit of
American workers. For many Americans, the benefits of free trade are
forgotten, and it is a clear issue of "us" against "them," particularly
those who have practiced protectionism in the past.
With the growing protectionist sentiment among American voters
and in Congress, it may be more true today than ever that free trade
may not be achieved without the existence of a worker adjustment
assistance program.2"' Urging support for his adjustment assistance
bill, then-Senator Humphrey told the Senate in 1955:
There will be differences of opinion as to whether these [unemployment]
problems are always brought about directly by tariff concessions. But the
problems are there. Even if they are not always directly attributable to
tariff cuts and imports, they are sometimes thought to be; and what people
think to be the truth has a very controlling influence on their decisions.
This is a political fact that many of us have to live with.20 2
From an economic point of view, tariffs and quotas inhibit the
flow of international trade, while adjustment assistance does not.
Moreover, assistance targeted directly to import-affected workers costs
far less nationally than tariffs and quotas.20 3 Thus since 1962, with the
passage of the Trade Expansion Act of that year,20 4 Congress has pro-
197 Henle, Trade Adjusment Assistance: Should It Be Modefed?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar.
1977, at 40, 45.
198 Id
199 See Millen, supra note 196, at 22.
200 See Bacon, supra note 32, at 1, 14.
201 See Millen, supra note 196.
202 101 CONG. REc. 5572 (1955).
203 See supra notes 74-78, 87 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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vided worker adjustment assistance as the theoretical quid pro quo to
gain support for liberal trade policies.2" 5 Indeed, while trade unions
have been reluctant rather than enthusiastic supporters of the pro-
gram,2°6 they have believed since 1962 that they have a foreign trade
contract with the federal government. Labor leaders would restrain
their members' protectionist sentiment, and in return the government
would provide worker adjustment assistance. 0 7
In his 1983 State of the Union address, President Reagan ex-
pressed a deep commitment to free trade. Recognizing that "[o]ne out
of every five jobs in our country depends on trade, ' 20 8 he said that he
would propose to Congress an international trade strategy "that in-
creases the openness of our trading system," and would "ask for new
negotiating authority to remove barriers and get more of our products
into foreign markets."'2 o' Thus President Reagan is directly con-
fronting the protectionist mood of Congress. In order to prevail, he
undoubtedly will have to assure Congress that he has not forgotten the
plight of workers who may be displaced as a result of liberalized trade.
In practical terms, this may mean supporting a new worker adjustment
assistance program.
Therefore, given the political need for worker adjustment assist-
ance, the following proposal is submitted as a program that will serve
the needs of import-affected workers more effectively and equitably
than previous programs.
VIII. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR THE FUTURE
The underlying theory of adjustment assistance is that through
supplemental unemployment insurance, retraining, job search grants
and relocation allowances, import-affected workers will gain employ-
ment in more promising industries, with benefits accruing both to them
and to the general economy.210 In other words, the program should
provide for the transfer of workers out of domestic industries in a con-
dition of permanent decline due to comparative disadvantage, to ex-
isting or new industries in fields in which the United States possesses a
comparative advantage. Obviously, retraining is fundamental to
achieving this goal. Therefore, worker adjustment assistance must
205 See Millen, supra note 196.
206 Henle, supra note 197, at 44.
207 Labor Takes A Turn Away From Free Trade, Bus. WEEK, July 27, 1981, at 24-25.
208 N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1983, at 10, col. 3.
209 Id
210 The program's goal must be distinguished from its rationale. In short, fairness and political
expediency provide the means through which this goal may be attained.
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evince a renewed commitment to providing retraining opportunities to
import-affected workers. The following six-point plan will help meet
this challenge.
First, the federal government should administer the program. In
practice this not only means that the federal government will mail
assistance checks, but more fundamentally it means the federal govern-
ment, and not the states, will determine individual eligibility. Thus,
not only will much needed uniformity be achieved,2 ' but the worker
will no longer be faced with having to coordinate among as many as
three governmental agencies.212 To achieve horizontal equity among
all import-affected workers, the program should not exclude service
and component-parts workers.213
Second, the State Job Training Coordinating Councils created
under the Job Training Partnership Act2 14 should be authorized to en-
courage schools and businesses to work together to retrain import-af-
fected workers. The councils, made up of business executives,
educators, labor representatives and other state and local leaders,2"5
would operate analogously to Massachusetts' Bay State Skills Corpora-
tion (BSSC). A not-for-profit, quasi-public corporation, BSSC was set
up by the state in 1981 to encourage training through cooperative ef-
forts by businesses, schools and state government.21 6 Its board of direc-
tors, like the new training councils, includes business executives,
educators, labor representatives, and other state and local leaders.2 17
Just as the training councils were created "solely to plan, coordi-
nate, and monitor the provision" of training services,218 so BSSC func-
tions as a catalyst by providing grants on a competitive basis to non-
profit training and education institutions that in turn obtain an equal
financial match from one or more businesses.219 Any nonprofit train-
ing organization-public or private, established university or besieged
employment security office-may then compete for BSSC's funds by
211 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
212 To obtain adjustment assistance, a worker under the current program can deal with as
many as three government agencies: the United States Department of Labor for certification; the
state unemployment insurance agency for cash benefits; and the state employment security office
for reemployment services. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 126, 139, 144 and accompanying text.
214 Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982).
215 96 Stat. 1322, § 122(a)(3) (1982).
216 EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING REP., Aug. 11, 1982, at 1278.
217 Id
218 96 Stat. 1322, § 122(a)(6) (1982).




submitting grant proposals.22 0 As a condition to a grant, a private com-
pany must match the funds, thus creating a relationship between the
training institution and the private company.22' While cash matching
grants are sufficient, BSSC prefers matching grants in the form of in-
structors, classroom equipment, loaned laboratories and the like.222
George S. Kariotis, chairman of BSSC and Massachusetts' Secretary of
Economic Affairs, has explained the benefits that accrue from direct
business participation:
If private businesses put some of their money into a training program, I
believe they will want something for that contribution--they may then
want to hire these skilled people. The companies gain by getting skilled
employees, the trainees gain by getting a job, and the Commonwealth
gains through increased tax revenue.
22
The adaptability of the BSSC concept to the needs of import-af-
fected workers can be illustrated by the Regis-Honeywell program.
Regis College, a four-year liberal arts college for women in Weston,
Massachusetts, in 1981 solicited Honeywell Corporation in nearby
Waltham with the idea of developing an intensive computer program-
uing course to retrain unemployed individuals for entry-level data
processing positions. 224 In 1982 thirty-five individuals were enrolled in
the course which ran from April 5 through November 12.225 A Honey-
well instructor worked with the students five hours a week, Tuesday
nights and Saturday mornings, at Regis, and then the students spent an
additional two hours in a Honeywell workshop.2 26 Since BSSC and
Honeywell underwrote the program, tuition was a nominal $150.227
Under the BSSC concept, the new State Job Training Coordinating
Councils could be endowed with funds to target to import-affected
workers, identify growth industries and promising fields, and then pro-
yide grants to training institutions that develop innovative retraining
programs for import-affected workers, and that have obtained an equal
financial match from one or more businesses.
Third, private industry should be provided tax incentives to coop-
220 See supra note 216.
221 Id
222 Sturdevant, Perpich Looks Eastward for High-Tech-Industry Advice, Minneapolis Star &
Trib., Nov. 14, 1982, at ID, 3D, col. 3-4.
223 Telephone interview with Kathy Scherek, Program Specialist, BSSC (Feb. 14, 1983) (dis-
cussing BSSC Promotional Brochure (Feb. 1982)).
224 1982 BSSC ANN. REP. at 10.
225 Regis-Honeywell Program Blunts Professional Layoffs, INDUSTRY, Oct. 1982, at 61 (INDUS-
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erate in retraining import-affected workers. In August 1982 Congress
passed a $6.7 billion, three-year increase in federal unemployment
taxes on employers.22 Relief from this increase may be enough to en-
courage firms to recognize that retraining the import-affected worker is
ultimately in their best interests. In order to qualify for a tax credit, a
firm could simply submit to the Internal Revenue Service a certificate
of cooperation issued by the training council. The amount of the credit
would, of course, be a function of the amount of resources the firm
commits to retraining import-affected workers. Such a tax credit
scheme would allow firms to recover some of the retraining costs that
the government would otherwise incur directly. At worst, this scheme
will cost no more than would direct government financing for retrain-
ing. In practice, however, this scheme will give firms the necessary in-
centive to retrain import-affected workers for available positions in
their firms, thus constituting true worker adjustment assistance.
Fourth, all import-affected workers in the United States should be
eligible to participate in any cooperative retraining program. This will
have the benefit of bringing a national perspective to worker adjust-
ment assistance.229 Provincialism in the training councils could be dis-
couraged by the federal government providing bonus funds to a
training council for every group of fifty nonresident import-affected
workers obtaining retraining in its jurisdiction.
Fifth, the federal government should establish a National Worker
Adjustment Assistance Fund from federal unemployment tax revenues.
One percent of those revenues, for example, could go to this fund,
which would be used to provide income support to an import-affected
worker whose state unemployment benefits have been exhausted. In
this regard, it is important to emphasize the observation of George
Denhard, BSSC Program Specialist, who said that unemployed work-
ers cannot enroll in longer, more advanced skill training courses unless
they have some kind of income support.230  Thus, import-affected
workers who enroll in a retraining program should obtain income sup-
port for the balance of the program. To encourage import-affected
workers to search aggressively for a retraining program, workers un-
able to find a retraining program should not receive income support
after they exhaust their state benefits. They should continue, however,
to be eligible for job search grants and relocation allowances.
228 Lublin, Unemployment Offices Strained by Staf Cuts and Heavy Caseloads, Wall St. J., Oct.
27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
229 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
230 EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING REP., Aug. 11, 1982, at 1279.
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Finally, all import-affected workers should be eligible to receive
job search grants and relocation allowances. These benefits can be
identical to those provided under the current worker adjustment assist-
ance program.2 3 ' To complement these benefits, however, a national
Job and Retraining Information Bank should be established. This
computer network would provide monthly information to import-af-
fected workers as to what job fields and geographical areas of the na-
tion appear promising.
Whether this six-point plan will work ultimately depends on the
attitude of import-affected workers toward retraining and work in gen-
eral. While they may be economically disadvantaged, they are not sub-
ject to easy manipulation. The notion that government can exert
leverage and get results quickly is naive and unrealistic. What govern-
ment can do is design a fair program and, over time, use its influence in
the right direction. In order to do that, however, it must provide ad-
justment assistance that is available to all import-affected workers, not
just the most vociferous ones, and provide it effectively. This six-point
plan fulfills those requirements.
IX. CONCLUSION
An unfortunate by-product of liberal trade policies is import-re-
lated layoffs. In periods of recession, such displacements are acutely
painful. Yet they must be tolerated, since protectionism only invites
retaliation and, in the final analysis, liberal trade policies provide more
benefits than costs. Moreover, the increased productivity of the United
States depends on opening international trade channels, and develop-
ing an effective marketing strategy for United States exports. There-
fore, Americans should see liberal trade policies not as a threat to
American jobs, but as a way out of recession.
To enable more Americans to accept this view, the United States
must have a special worker adjustment assistance program that helps
import-affected workers adjust to foreign competition. From an eco-
nomic point of view, tariffs and quotas inhibit the flow of international
trade, while worker adjustment assistance does not. Moreover, assist-
ance targeted specifically to import-affected workers costs far less na-
tionally than tariffs and quotas.
The current worker adjustment assistance program expires Sep-
tember 30, 1983. Although this program has largely failed, Congress
must boldly face the current protectionist sentiment and redesign the
231 See infra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
425
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:394(1983)
program so that import-affected workers are assisted in moving from
declining industries to promising ones. Nothing less than America's
economic health depends on Congress' moderating the current protec-
tionist mood. With its emphasis on retraining and private sector in-
volvement, enactment of this Comment's six-point plan should help
provide an effective worker adjustment assistance program for the
future.
X. APPENDIX
Current Program Procedure & Benefits
An import-affected worker's eligibility for adjustment assistance is
initiated by a petition filed with the Secretary of Labor by "a group of
workers or by their certified or recognized union or other duly author-
ized representative." '232 On receipt of the petition, the Secretary must
"promptly publish notice in the Federal Register that he has received
the petition and initiated an investigation." '233 After notice of the peti-
232 19 U.S.C. §2271(a)(Supp. IV 1980). From April 1975 through June 1982, 77% of the im-
port-affected workers who were certified belonged to trade unions. On the other hand, 44% of the
workers whose petitions were denied belonged to trade unions. President's Report, supra note
115, at 202. The limited use made of worker adjustment assistance by nonunion workers has been
a consistent complaint. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFF., CERTIFYING WORKERS FOR ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE-THE FIRST YEAR UNDER THE
TRADE ACT 13, No. 77-28 (May 31, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO CERTIFICATION REPORT].
In addition, see Lacy v. Automobile Workers Local 287, 88 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 111,921 (1979),
where the court held in part that, since under 19 U.S.C. § 2271(a) the plaintiffs could have filed a
petition for themselves, the United Auto Workers union did not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion by not filing a petition on plaintiffs' behalf within the prescribed time limits.
Under 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1), a worker may not obtain adjustment assistance if he fails to
petition within one year of his last total or partial separation from his former employer. AS of
1978, the Department of Labor has estimated that some 26,000 workers have been denied benefits
because of this one year cutoff. H.R. REP. No. 1056, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978). For testimony
on whether the cutoff period should be extended, see Eligibility of Workers to Receive Adjustment
Assistance: Hearing on H. 15421 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
andMeans, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 36 (1976). For a brief discussion of the injustice this rule may
create, see Cprek, supra note 149, at 662-63.
233 19 U.S.C. § 2271(a)(Supp. IV 1980). See Woodrum v. Donovan, 544 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1982). In Woodrum, the Secretary admitted that he had received a petition on behalf of the
plaintiffs, that he had failed to publish a notice in the Federal Register, and that he failed to
conduct an investigation. Id at 205. He argued, however, that his denial of certification to the
workers should be upheld because it was within his discretion to modify the procedural directives
of the statute. Id In the alternative, he argued that even if it was wrong for him to take "proce-
dural shortcuts," these lapses constituted harmless error. Id The court did not accept these argu-
ments, and held that "[t]he Secretary's failure to conduct an investigation, and his failure to
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tion has been published, the petitioners, or others whom the Secretary
deems to be interested in the proceedings, have ten days within which
to request a public hearing at which they may be present, produce evi-
dence, and be heard. 34 No later than sixty days after the filing of the
petition, the Secretary must determine whether the petitioning group
meets the requirements of the Act.z35 These requirements are three-
fold. First, they require the Secretary to find that a significant number
or proportion of the workers in the petitioners' firm, or an appropriate
subdivision of the firm, have become totally or partially separated, or
are threatened to become totally or partially separated.23 6 Second, the
Secretary must find that the sales or production, or both, of the peti-
tioners' firm, or appropriate subdivision, have decreased absolutely
2 37
Finally, the Secretary must find that increases of imports of "articles
like or directly competitive" with articles2 38 produced by petitioners'
firm, or appropriate subdivision, were a "substantial cause"2 39 of such
provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to request a hearing, thus prejudiced plaintiffs' right to a
fair consideration of their petition at the administrative level, as well as their right to meaningful
judicial review." Id at 208.
Note that the exclusionary effect of the failure to publish notice was to prohibit the plaintiffs
from requesting a hearing. Id at 206. The exclusionary effect of the failure to conduct an investi-
gation was to exclude facts directly relevant to the Secretary's determination from the administra-
tive record. Id at 207.
The Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance (OTAA) is the body within the Department of
Labor responsible for investigating petitions for certification of group eligibility for worker adjust-
ment assistance. Under 19 U.S.C. § 2320 (1976), the Secretary is authorized to prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the adjustment assistance program.
234 19 U.S.C. § 2271(b) (Supp. IV 1980). On the enforcement of this provision see Woodrum v.
Donovan, supra note 233, at 208. On a court's view of the nature of the certification process, see
Local 167 v. Marshall, 643 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981), where the First Circuit noted the "exparte
nature of the certification process," and said that "the certification process does not allow peti-
tioner the opportunity to test credibility that it would have in an adversary proceeding." Id at 3 1.
235 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a)(Supp. IV 1980), reads in part:
As soon as possible after the date on which a petition is filed .... but in any event not later
than 60 days after that date, the Secretary shall determine whether the petitioning group
meets the requirements. . . and shall issue a certification of eligibility to apply for assistance
... covering workers in any group which meets such requirements.
This deadline, however, is admittedly illusory. In 1981, the Senate Finance Committee reported
that the Secretary had not met this requirement in a single instance during the prior year. S. REP.
No. 139, supra note 110, at 799. For a report on the delay in the certification process, see GAO
CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 232, at 37-41.
236 19 U.S.C. § 2272(1)(Supp. IV 1980).
237 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1976). This requirement appears to ensure that the petitioners' firm has
not laid off workers on one product line within a plant, for example, while hiring workers for
another line. Cprek, supra note 149, at 670.
238 See supra notes 139, 144, 147-49 and accompanying text.
239 In 1981, Congress attempted to tighten the causal link between increased imports, on the
one hand, and worker layoffs and declining firm production or sales, on the other. S. REP. No.
139, supra note 110, at 802, 1363.
Originally under the Trade Act, the third requirement was that increased imports had to have
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total or partial separation, or threat thereof, and of such decline in sales
or production.240
If the Secretary determines that the requirements are met, he then
issues a certification of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance.
The certification, significantly, has been interpreted to entitle not only
the petitioners to apply for assistance, but to entitle all workers who are
separated from the firm within the terms of the certification to do so.
2 4 '
Whether or not the requirements are met, the Secretary must
promptly publish a summary of his determination in the Federal Regis-
ter, together with his reasons for his determination.242 Petitioners de-
nied certification may request reconsideration of their petition.243 In
addition, denied petitioners may obtain judicial review of the Secre-
tary's determination in the United States Court of International
Trade.2' The standard of review is "substantial evidence"; the find-
"contributed importantly" to worker layoffs and declining firm production or sales. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2272 (1976). The 1981 amendments changed this requirement to provide that increased imports
must have been a "substantial cause" of the worker layoffs and declining firm production or sales.
This change is significant because "contributed importantly" was defined as a cause which is im-
portant, but not necessarily more important than any other cause. By contrast, "substantial cause"
is defined as a cause which is important and not less than any other cause. 19 U.S.C. § 2272
(Supp. V 1981), amending 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1976).
Thus the "substantial cause" standard is considerably more strict. For example, a cause
which contributed 40% to worker layoffs and declining firm production or sales is undoubtedly
"important," but it is not a "substantial cause" if there also existed a separate cause which contrib-
uted 41% or more. The difficulty or impossibility of determining the degree of causation as used
above, for example, highlights the considerable discretion given to the Secretary to determine
worker eligibility for adjustment assistance.
240 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (Supp. V 1981), amending 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1976).
241 Lloyd v. United States Dep't of Labor, 637 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980). Here the court
explained:
A certification of eligibility applies to all affected workers at the firm within the terms of the
certification, not only to those who brought the petition. The certification of eligibility itself
does not entitle the workers to assistance; rather it is akin to a preliminary entitlement step.
Only those in the eligibility group may apply for assistance.
The terms of certification include the date on which the total or partial separation began or
threatened to begin. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a) (1976). This date is commonly called the "impact date."
When worker layoffs are no longer attributable to conditions meeting the Act's three require-
ments, the Secretary must terminate certification and publish promptly in the Federal Register a
"termination date." 19 U.S.C. § 2273(d) (1976).
242 19 U.S.C. § 2273(c) (1976).
243 29 C.F.R. § 90.18 (1980). A request for reconsideration must be filed within 30 days of
publication of the Secretary's determination in the FederalRegister. Id Administrative reconsid-
eration does not preclude, nor is it a prerequisite to, judicial review of the determination. 42 Fed.
Reg. 32,772 (1977) (comment C-5).
244 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) (Supp. IV 1980), replacing 19 U.S.C. § 2322(a) (1976). Formerly under
the Trade Act, the Secretary's determinations were reviewed in the federal courts of appeal. 19
U.S.C. § 2322(a) (1976), replaced by 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Despite the thousands
of administrative determinations under the Trade Act, there are only eleven appellate court deci-
sions: Morristown v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1982); Local 798 v. Donovan, 652 F.2d 702
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ings of fact by the Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive.24 The court may, of course, remand the case to the Secre-
tary to take further evidence.246
Once workers are certified for adjustment assistance, the federal
government's administrative responsibilities with respect to those work-
ers effectively ends.24 7 The states deliver adjustment assistance under
agreements between each state and the Secretary. 248 Thus, once certi-
fied, individual workers must apply for adjustment assistance at their
state employment security offices.
Although weekly cash benefits have been the most commonly
sought form of adjustment assistance,249 the other forms of adjustment
assistance offered under the Trade Act include training, job search
grants and relocation allowances, as well as other reemployment serv-
ices like counseling, testing and job placement. To obtain training, a
certified worker may seek approval of a training program by his state
employment security office, acting as the Secretary of Labor's agent, or
the state agency may approve a training program for the worker on its
(7th Cir. 1981); Local167v. Marshall, 643 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1981);Pemberton v. Marshall, 639 F.2d
798 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lloyd v. Dep't of Labor, 637 F.2d 1267(9th Cir. 1980); UAWv. Marshall, 627
F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1979); Machine Printers v.
Marshall, 595 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Glass v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
UAW v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and Paden v. Dep't of Labor, 562 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1977). In the United States Court of International Trade, there had been only one appeal as
of September 1982: Woodrum v. Donovan, 544 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
There was no statutory provision for judicial review under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 80 Stat. 872 (1962). United Shoe Workers v. Bedell, 506 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir.
1974), which provides a helpful review of the TEA's legislative history, id at 179-85, is the only
case which evolved out of the TEA. Cprek, supra note 149, at 598 n.19. According to Cprek, the
Bedell court held that determinations under the TEA were subject to review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976). Cprek, supra note 149, at 598 n.17.
Currently under the Trade Act, the judgment of the United States Court of International
Trade is subject to review by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2395(c) (Supp. IV 1980), replacing 19 U.S.C. § 2322(a) (1976). The judgment of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals is subject to review by the United States Supreme Court on certio-
rari Id As of September 1982, a Supreme Court decision had never evolved out of the Trade
Act.
245 19 U.S.C. § 2395(b) (Supp. IV 1980), replacing 19 U.S.C. § 2322(b) (1976).
246 Id
247 29 C.F.R. § 91.51 (1979) provides that, after the Secretary determines which general catego-
ries of workers are eligible for adjustment assistance, the unemployment insurance agencies of the
states have jurisdiction to determine the entitlements of individual claimants.
248 19 U.S.C. § 2311(a) (Supp. V 1981), amendig 19 U.S.C. § 2311(a) (1976) provides in part:
Under such an agreement, the cooperating State agency (I) as agent of the United States, will
receive applications for, and will provide, payments on the basis provided in this part,
(2) where appropriate, will afford adversely affected workers testing, counseling, referral to
training, and placement services, and (3) will otherwise cooperate with the Secretary and with.
other State and Federal agencies in providing payments and services under this part.
249 See supra notes 103-04, 110 and accompanying text.
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own initiative. Upon obtaining approval of a training program, the
worker is entitled to have the federal government pay for the cost of the
program.250 In addition, if the training facility is beyond commuting
distance from his home, the worker may be entitled to allowances for
resulting transportation and subsistence expenses.251  The certified
worker may also be eligible for a job search allowance. This assistance
covers ninety percent of the worker's necessary job search expenses, up
to a maximum of $600.252 In order to receive it, he must file an appli-
cation with his state employment security office,253 and meet three re-
quirements. First, the application must be timely filed.2 54 Second, the
worker must be totally separated from his prior employment, and must
intend to use the allowance to secure a job within the United States.255
Finally, the Secretary must determine that the worker cannot reason-
ably be expected to secure suitable employment in the commuting area
in which he resides. 6
Once certified, the import-affected worker may also receive a relo-
cation allowance.257 This assistance covers ninety percent of the
worker's reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in transporting
himself, his family and his household effects, plus a lump sum
equivalent to three times the worker's average weekly wage, up to a
maximum of $600.211 Before this assistance will be provided, however,
six requirements must be met. First, the worker must have obtained
suitable employment, or a bona fide offer of suitable employment, af-
fording him the reasonable expectation of enjoying long-term employ-
250 19 U.S.C. § 2296(a) (Supp. V 1981).
251 19 U.S.C. § 2296(b) (Supp. V 1981).
252 19 U.S.C. § 2297(a) (Supp. V 1981), amending 19 U.S.C. § 2297(a) (1976). Before the 1981
amendments became effective, the job search allowance covered 80% of the worker's necessary job
search expenses, up to a maximum of $500.
253 19 U.S.C. § 2297(a) (Supp. V 1981). Although the Trade Act of 1974 provides that the
worker may file his application with the Secretary, the worker actually files the application with
his state employment security office which functions as the Secretary's agent. Wojcik Interview,
supra note 115.
254 The worker must file the application with his state employment security office (1) within
one year after the certification date, (2) within one year after the worker's last total separation, or
(3) within six months after completing an approved training program. 19 U.S.C. § 2297(b)(3)
(Supp. V 1981).
255 Id at § 2297(b)(1).
256 Id at § 2297(b)(2). The state employment security office makes the determination as the
Secretary's agent. Wojeik Interview, supra note 115.
257 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a) (Supp. V 1981).
258 19 U.S.C. § 2298(d) (Supp. V 1981), amending 19 U.S.C. § 2298(d) (1976). Before the 1981
amendments became effective, the relocation allowance covered 80% of the worker's reasonable
and necessary expenses plus a lump sum payment no greater than $500.
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ment in the area in which he wishes to relocate. 9 Second, the area in
which the worker wishes to be relocated must be within the United
States.260 Third, the state employment security office must determine
that the worker cannot reasonably be expected to secure suitable em-
ployment in the commuting area in which he resides.26' Fourth, the
worker must be totally separated from employment at the time reloca-
tion commences.262 Fifth, the worker's relocation must occur within six
months after the date on which he filed an application for a relocation
allowance, or within six months after completing an approved training
program. 263 Finally, the application must be timely filed.2 1
Steven T O'Hara
259 19 U.S.C. § 2298(b) (Supp. V 1981).
260 Id
261 Id This is determined by the state employment security office acting as the Secretary's
agent. Wojcik Interview, supra note 115.
262 19 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
2 6 3 ld at § 2298(c).
264 The worker must file the application with his state employment security office within 14
months after the certification date, (2) within 14 months after the worker's last total separation, or
(3) within six months after completing a training program to which the Secretary referred him. Id
at § 2298(a).
